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Abstract
We investigate why governments restrict exports of exotic raw materials taking
rare earth elements as a case study. Trade restrictions on exotic materials do not
have immediate macroeconomic effects. Relocating rare earth intensive industries is
found to be the main reason behind China’s export barriers. They are part of a more
extensive strategy aiming at creating comparative advantages in these sectors and at
overcoming path dependencies. Moreover, export barriers serve as a second-best in-
strument to reduce pollution and to slow down the depletion of exhaustible resources.
Growing domestic rare earth consumption renders those increasingly ineffective. Ris-
ing reliance on mine-site regulation indicates that this fact is taken into account. Rare
earth extraction is dominated by a few large companies; the demand side is dispersed.
That speaks against successful lobbying for export restrictions. It appears as if the
export barriers are set up to compensate mining firms.
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1 Introduction
Under the impression of boosting raw material prices, many nations supplying natural
resources started to (further) restrict commodity exports from 2003 onwards. Metals
were, by no means, an exception to that rule. Kim (2010) reports that 28 WTO members
had export restrictions on metals and minerals in force between 2003 and 2009. Among
the metals affected are a number of exotic elements such as antimony, niobium, and rare
earths (EU Commission, 2010). Many of those were subsequently classified as critical raw
materials by the US or the EU.
Raw materials are categorised as critical if they are both of high economic importance
for domestic industries and if their supply is dominated by one or a few (politically unsta-
ble) nations (U.S. Department of Energy, 2011; EU Commission, 2010). Rare earths are
the most well known example of critical raw materials. They are used in a diverse number
of applications including high performance permanent magnets, ceramic capacitors, and
defense technology. From the early 2000s to 2012, China accounted for around 95 per cent
of global rare earth supply. Even today, more than 85 per cent of rare earths are mined
in China. The People’s Republic has implemented strict export restrictions.
Economic literature on export barriers is mostly concerned with food and other agri-
cultural products as well as fossil fuels. The motivation for governments to restrict exports
of exotic metals is likely to differ from those for crude oil or rice. They are only used as an
intermediate input in downstream industries and their production is small, both in mone-
tary and quantity terms. Thus, neither distributive effects nor major direct influences on
macroeconomic variables are likely if their exports are hindered.
We investigate reasons why nations restrict exports of ”exotic” raw materials, taking
rare earth elements as a case study. We inspect five main motivations: Influencing the
terms-of-trade, attracting foreign industries, limiting pollution due to mining activities,
generating government revenues, and serving special interest groups. The latter explic-
itly acknowledges policy makers’ self-interested behaviour. Comparing these motivations
with stylised facts of rare earth markets and Chinese policies allows us to evaluate how
influential the five motivations are in practice.
Despite considerable political and public interest in rare earths, only a few authors
assess the rationale behind China’s export barriers systematically. Hurst (2010) inves-
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tigates how China achieved its dominance on rare earth markets and the challenges it
currently faces as well as implications for the West. Hayes-Labruto et al. (2013) contrast
perspectives on rare earth policies in the West and within China where environmental
and social aspects gain importance. Wu¨bbeke (2013) focuses on policy narratives within
China highlighting the interaction between policy goals. We are, to our knowledge, the
first authors using a political economy framework to investigate the export restrictions on
rare earths.
Our analysis demonstrates that relocating industries is the most important driver
behind China’s export barriers for rare earths. The trade restrictions are part of a long-
term strategy to turn China into a stronghold of rare earth based industries and to realise
economies of agglomeration. Export restrictions are also second-best instruments to cope
with the considerable environmental damages caused by rare earth mining as long as costs
of enforcing regulation on the mine level are prohibitive. But as China’s domestic rare
earth consumption grows steadily, export restrictions become less and less effective. The
combination of a concentrated supply side and scattered demand for the metals indicates
that the former have a higher propensity for successful lobbying activities. It appears as
if policy makers use rents from quantitative restrictions as a bargaining chip with special
interest groups. Generation of government revenues and influence on the terms-of-trade
are of limited importance.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on rare earths’ prop-
erties as well as on their markets and Chinese export restrictions. Section 3 assesses
the relevance of the theoretical arguments for China’s intervention in rare earth markets.
Some recent developments on rare earth markets are discussed in the light of our results
in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Rare Earths: An Overview
2.1 Basic Properties
The terms rare earths or rare earth elements denote a group of 17 metals. They include
the lanthanides, the elements with atomic numbers from 57 (lanthanum) to 71 (lutetium)
as well as scandium (21) and yttrium (39). Rare earths are usually subdivided into light
rare earth elements (LREE) and heavy rare earths elements (HREE). The light ones are
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located on the left side of the periodic table, whereas heavy rare earths are found on the
right. Yttrium is included in the latter due to its greater chemical similarity to them. A
detailed overview on rare earths’ physical and chemical properties is provided by Gupta
and Krishnamurthy (2005).
Due to the lanthanide contraction, a unique structure of electrons within their atoms,
all rare earths except scandium have similar ionic radii and thereby similar chemical
properties. Because of their chemical similarity, rare earths usually occur together in
their deposits. It also makes separating them from each other technically challenging and
economically costly.
Rare earths are not rare in a geological sense. The most abundant rare earth, cerium,
is roughly as abundant in the Earth’s crust as copper. Even the rarest stable rare earth,
lutetium, is more abundant than gold or platinum. They attain their rarity from the fact
that they are rarely found in concentrations making their extraction profitable.
2.2 Supply
China almost monopolistically supplies rare earths to the world market. About 133,000
metric tons of rare earth oxides (REO) were mined in 2011, 97 per cent thereof in the
People’s Republic (U.S. Geological Survey, 2012b). Figure 1 shows that this has not
always been the case. From the mid-1960s to mid-1980s, the Mountain Pass mine in
California was the most important supplier of rare earths worldwide. China started to
expand its production massively in the late 1970s and 1980s. Its growing exports drove
down rare earth prices in the 1990s forcing competitors to exit the market (Hurst, 2010).
The Mountain Pass mine reopened in 2012 putting the US back on the map of rare earth
producing nations.
Three regions mainly account for China’s rare earth production. The majority takes
place in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. It accounts for approximately 50 to 60
per cent of Chinese output. Rare earths from Inner Mongolia are mostly mined at the
Bayan Obo mine as a by-product of iron ore extraction. Accounting for 40 to 50 per cent
of worldwide production, Bayan Obo is the world’s largest rare earth mine. 24 to 30 per
cent of China’s rare earths stem from the Sichuan province. The rest is mined in the
southern deposits, in the Provinces of Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangxi (Tse, 2011; U.S.
Geological Survey, 2010). Rare earths from Sichuan or the southern deposits are often
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Source: U.S. Geological Survey (2012a, 2015)
produced by small scale mines. Illegal extraction plays an important role, in particular
for the southern deposits where remote and inaccessible locations simplify the operation
of illegal mines (SCIO, 2012).
Reserves of rare earths are dispersed much more widely than production. According to
U.S. Geological Survey (2012b), China holds approximately 50 per cent of the worldwide
reserves of 114 million tons. Other important deposits are found in the Commonwealth of
Independent States1, the United States, India, and Australia. The Chinese government
estimates its own share of worldwide reserves to be much smaller, at approximately 23
per cent (SCIO, 2012).
A large number of junior mining companies attempt to enter the rare earth market. By
the end of July 2013, 52 projects outside China estimated their resources by international
standards (Hatch, 2013b). More than 400 mining projects aim at setting up a rare earth
mine (Hatch, 2012a). That indicates a potentially more diverse mining sector in the future.
The entry of non-Chinese suppliers could deteriorate China’s market power (Pothen, 2013,
2014).
1The Commonwealth of Independent States is an organisation of former Soviet republics. As of 2015,
it consists of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan.
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Up until now, rare earths have been recycled only in negligible quantities (Du and
Graedel, 2011; Schu¨ler et al., 2011). There is some re-melting of new scrap from permanent
magnet production but the metals are not retrieved from discarded products.
2.3 Demand
Rare earths serve as an input for a multiplicity of different products. U.S. Geological
Survey (2011) identifies eight main applications. Table 1 provides an overview. To make
them more tangible, exemplary products are listed. The last two columns show the amount
of rare earth oxides (REO) used per application in tonnes per year (tpa) in 2008 and the
share of heavy rare earths needed in the application, respectively. The latter reflects the
great diversity of rare earths used in each application.
Application Exemplary Products tpa REO % HREO
Glass industry Polishing powders, colourised or decolourised glass 28,444 3
Catalysts Catalysts for fluid cracking, automotive catalysts 27,380 0
Magnets Permanent magnets in hard discs, wind turbines 26,228 7
Battery alloys Nickel-metal-hydride (NiMH) batteries 12,098 0
Metallurgy Steel and aluminium alloys 11,503 0
Phosphors TV sets, monitors, fluorescent lamps 9,002 81
Ceramics Superconductors, Ceramic capacitors 7,000 53
Other Paints and pigments, waste water treatment 7,520 21
Table 1: Most important applications of rare earths
Source: Schu¨ler et al. (2011); U.S. Geological Survey (2011)
China also plays an important role in demand for rare earth elements. In 2012, 68
per cent of worldwide consumption of the metals took place in the People’s Republic
(Kingsnorth, 2012).
Demand for rare earths is expected to grow strongly. Table 2 displays the projections
by Kingsnorth (2012). He forecasts the overall demand for rare earths to grow from 105,000
tpa in 2011 to 160,000 tpa in 2016. Annual growth rates differ notably by application,
ranging from 2-4 per cent for catalysts to 8-12 per cent for magnets. Alonso et al. (2012)
estimate future demand for rare earths applied in wind turbines and electric vehicles, most
notably neodymium (Nd) and dysprosium (Dy) used in permanent magnets. They expect
demand to grow by between 700 and 2,600 per cent over the next 25 years.
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Application Demand 2011 Projection 2016
tpa tpa
Catalysts 20,000 25,000
Glass 8,000 10,000
Polishing 14,000 18,000
Metal alloys 21,000 30,000
Magnets 21,000 36,000
Phosphors 8,000 12,000
Ceramics 7,000 10,000
Other 6,000 19,000
Total 105,000 160,000
Table 2: Demand projections
Source: Kingsnorth (2012)
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Figure 2: Prices of LREO and HREO in US$ per kg
Source: asianmetal.com, own calculations
Figure 2 shows the prices of light rare earth oxides (LREO, left hand side) and heavy
rare earth oxides (HREO, right hand side) in US$ per kg, both in China and in the rest of
the world (RoW). A first large increase of prices was visible in 2008. The second and more
severe spike took place in 2011. After that extreme phase, prices of rare earths exhibited
a falling trend. Prices in the rest of the world exceed the Chinese notably, mostly due to
the export barriers.
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2.5 China’s Export Restrictions and Related Policies
Already in 1990, the Chinese government declared rare earths to be a strategic raw mate-
rial. Foreign firms were banned from all mining, smelting, and separating activities unless
they form a joint venture with a Chinese company. Extraction quotas are set by the cen-
tral government but have proved to be ineffective (Tse, 2011). Several further measures
restricting exports of rare earths were implemented. They can be grouped into 1) tariffs
and taxes and 2) quantitative export restrictions.
Exporters of rare earths pay ad-valorem export taxes. They range from 15 per cent
to 25 per cent and are levied on ores, intermediate products, pure metals, but also alloys
containing rare earths (Tse, 2011). In 2007, the Chinese government abolished the 16 per
cent value added tax refund on exports of unprocessed rare earths (Korinek and Kim,
2010) which was introduced in the mid-1990s to encourage exports (Tse, 2011).
Quotas limit exported quantities. These quotas have been tightened gradually over
the last years from 65,600 tpa in 2005 to 31,000 tpa in 2012. Starting in 2012, the Chinese
government has set separate export quotas for light and heavy rare earths. The export
quotas remained virtually unchanged in 2013 (Hatch, 2013a).
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Figure 3: Chinese export quotas 2005 to 2013
Source: Tse (2011); Hatch (2012b,c, 2013a)
Export licenses are allocated directly by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Firms
applying for them have to fulfil a number of conditions to be eligible. These include
compliance to environmental and social security standards, minimum firm size and that all
rare earths must originate from licensed mining operations. Since 2012, MOFCOM grants
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licenses only to firms passing inspection by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (Liu
and Maughan, 2012).
According to the United States’ delegation at the World Trade Organization, China
relies on further, less transparent measures to restrict rare earth exports. Firms subject
to export licenses are, for example, bound to minimum export prices (WTO, 2012).
Significant shares of rare earths are smuggled out of China, circumventing the ex-
port restrictions. Hurst (2010) states that approximately one third of all rare earth
exports in 2008 were shipped abroad illegally. Illegal exports appear to have declined,
however. While the Chinese export statistics were between 20,000 and 30,000 tons per
year lower than foreign import data from 2006 to 2008, this number fell to 3,000 tons in
2011 (Wu¨bbeke, 2013).
The Chinese government aims at creating a more concentrated rare earth industry,
allowing for greater control of domestic extraction (SCIO, 2012). It divided the country
into three large mining districts displayed in figure 4: The northern district encompassing
Inner Mongolia and Shandong, the western district being Sichuan, the southern consisting
of Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian, Hunan and Guangxi (Hurst, 2010).
Figure 4: Proposed rare earth districts
Source: Hurst (2010)
The Baotou Steel Rare-Earth (Group) Hi-Tech, a subsidiary of Bao Steel and owner
of the Bayan Obo Mine, is planned to become the sole producer of rare earths in Inner
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Mongolia. It was reported that it integrated 12 rare earth producers in 2012 (China Daily,
2012). Similar developments are taking place in the southern province of Jiangxi where
major amounts of heavy rare earths are produced. The state-owned Ganzhou Rare Earth
Group Co was founded by merging a number of local rare earths producers (Xinhua, 2013).
The Chinese government states that it aims at developing ”large-scale, highly-efficient, and
clean production enterprises” (SCIO, 2012).
In March 2012, the US, the EU, and Japan filed a complaint at the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) about Chinese trade restrictions for rare earths, tungsten and molyb-
denum. The three parties accused the Chinese authorities of violating the GATT and
parts of China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO 2. This development is discussed in
subsection 4.1.
3 Motivations for Export Restrictions
3.1 Influencing Terms-of-Trade
The terms-of-trade effect is the textbook example of mechanisms raising domestic welfare
through trade barriers (Johnson, 1953). China possesses power on rare earth markets. If
the People’s Republic restricts its exports, it drives a wedge between (reduced) domestic
and (increased) international prices. Higher revenues from rare earth exports allow the
households in China to consume more imported goods. They enjoy a welfare gain at the
expense of the rest of the world.
The idea behind the terms-of-trade effect is straightforward, its practical implementa-
tion is not. Finding an optimal level of trade restrictions is challenging, both theoretically
(Helpman and Krugman, 1989; Deardorff and Rajaraman, 2009; De Santis, 2000) and em-
pirically (Piermartini, 2004). Empirical evidence that the terms-of-trade effect is relevant
for actual trade policy exists, though (Broda et al., 2008).
When applying for export licenses, firms need a minimum size or export volume
and they have to prove compliance with environmental and social standards (Liu and
Maughan, 2012). This excludes small firms from selling rare earths abroad. Such regula-
tion can be interpreted as an application of Rodrik (1989). He analyses how to optimally
2For a detailed summary of the dispute, see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_
e/ds432_e.htm
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exploit the terms-of-trade effect in the presence of non-atomistic firms of heterogeneous
size. He shows that tariffs should decrease with firm size because large firms can internalise
their market power by themselves.
The terms-of-trade effect’s relevance is confined by the small share of rare earths in
China’s exports. Figure 5 shows the share of rare earths in China’s exports. The People’s
Republic officially exported 2.7 billion US$ worth of rare earths in 2011. In the same year,
its exports totalled 1.9 trillion US$. Rare earths accounted for only .14 per cent of those.
As figure 5 shows, this number is even smaller in most years.
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Figure 5: Share of rare earths in China’s total exports in per cent
Source: UN comtrade, own calculations.
3.2 Attracting Foreign Industries
The relocation of firms is another channel through which export barriers can raise do-
mestic welfare (Ossa, 2011). Restricting rare earth exports lowers their prices inside and
raises them outside China. Downstream industries in the People’s Republic face reduced
production costs and expand their output while foreign competitors have to exit the mar-
ket. Domestic consumers enjoy welfare gains from increased factor income as well as more
and cheaper domestic varieties. Welfare grows on the expenses of others, however.
Fostering growth of domestic industries is declared to be a goal by Chinese sources.
Developing specific industries is listed as a purpose why exports of goods might be re-
stricted in the Chinese Foreign Trade Law (Liu and Maughan, 2012) and is sometimes
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admitted to be a target quite frankly by Chinese officials (Xinhua, 2009).
The terms-of-trade and the production relocation argument share their static nature.
If China’s power on rare earth markets vanishes, its ability to manipulate prices strategi-
cally declines. Raising world market prices, Chinese policy creates incentives for foreign
suppliers to enter the market and to undermine China’s market power.3 The Chinese gov-
ernment can anticipate potential market entry. Thus, either she discounts future welfare
strongly and accepts the risk of losing market power to exploit market power in the short
run. Or she expects that export restrictions help to overcome market failures or path
dependencies limiting industrial growth and allow for sustained effects.
The most well-known example of a market failure limiting growth of industries are
learning externalities which underlie the infant industry argument. Let us assume that
Chinese firms want to enter the market for a high-tech good but lack experience in its
production and thus suffer from higher costs than their foreign competitors. The com-
parative disadvantage vanishes as Chinese firms produce and gain experience themselves.
If learning effects are external to the firm, because workers are hired by competitors for
instance, an incentive to free-ride arises. This justifies government intervention. Melitz
(2005) shows that trade restrictions can serve as a second-best instrument to counteract
the learning externalities if subsidies on production are not feasible.
The infant industry argument is of limited relevance for Chinese rare earth-based
industries. Take the production of Neodymium Iron Boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets
as an example. Figure 6 shows the production of NdFeB magnets by region. Already in
2005, the majority of NdFeB magnets were manufactured in the People’s Republic. On
an aggregate level, China accounted for more than 20 per cent of worldwide consumption
of rare earths in 2000 already. The industry outgrew its infant stage.
An explanation why the relocation of industries might be permanent can be derived
from Amiti (2005). Imagine a firm deciding upon where to locate its production. It
faces two, potentially opposing, incentives. It can either produce in a region abundant
in the production factors it needs and exploit comparative advantages a la Heckscher-
Ohlin. Or it can set up production close to customers and suppliers and save trade costs.
3Under optimistic assumptions, Pothen (2014) finds that non-Chinese mines might supply 137,000 tons
per year or about half of the world consumption by 2020. Section 4 indicates that this development is
likely to remain absent.
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Figure 6: NdFeB permanent magnet production by region in kt
Source: Shaw and Constantinides (2012).
Economies of agglomeration arise if firms locate close to each other because they provide
cheap intermediate inputs to each other.
Sectors can sustain in a region with comparative disadvantages because the economies
of agglomeration overcompensate for higher factor costs. It is inefficient for an individual
firm to move to the other region and the firms cannot coordinate to relocate collectively.
Firms only relocate if the comparative advantage is strong enough to make it beneficial
for them individually.
China’s export restrictions on rare earths can be interpreted in the light of this theory.
China was rich in rare earths and consequently possessed a comparative advantage in
rare earth intensive goods already in the 1980s. Its market size was small, however, and
it lacked other factors important for the production of high-tech goods such as qualified
labour, capital, or institutional quality. Consequently, industries employing rare earths
emerged in the US, Japan or Europe.
Over the last decades, China implemented a broad strategy to create a comparative
advantage in rare earth-based industries. Since the 1980s, the People’s Republic has un-
dertaken considerable efforts to educate qualified labour and to establish a comprehensive
research infrastructure focusing on rare earths. Three scientific institutes conduct re-
search solely on rare earth elements. The Baotou Research Institute of Rare Earths in
Inner Mongolia is the world’s largest, with a staff of about 700. The other ones are the
State Key Laboratory of Rare Earth Materials Chemistry and Applications, affiliated to
Peking University, and the State Key Laboratory of Rare Earth Resource Utilization in
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Changchun in the northeastern province of Jilin. The latter is affiliated to the Chinese
Academy of Sciences. Additionally, the General Research Institute for Nonferrous Metals
conducts research on rare earths (Hurst, 2010). Motohashi and Yun (2007) confirm the
close link between public research and the mining sector in China. They find that the
mining industry is among those cooperating most intensively with third party researchers.
Note that while China achieved a strong position in research on rare earth elements, gaps
to cutting-edge technology still persist (Wu¨bbeke, 2013).
Export restrictions contribute to the comparative advantage. They reduce costs for
downstream firms and make relocation of production more favourable. It is, however,
important to interpret the trade barriers as part of a broader strategy. Empirical stud-
ies indicate that the availability of cheap raw materials alone has only a limited effect.
Luo et al. (2008) analyse factors determining foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into
China’s hinterland. They do not find a statistically significant impact of wealth in fossil
fuels. Agglomerations and the availability of qualified labour, however, have significant
positive effects on FDI inflows. Luo et al. (2008) do not control for specific sectors and
the importance of natural resources is probably underestimated for resource intensive in-
dustries. Amiti and Javorcik (2008) also find access to customers and upstream firms to
be of importance, in particular on a regional scale.
Recall that policy makers have to take opportunity costs into account when they
decide upon export restrictions. Export barriers subsidise downstream industries but also
disturb input prices. Relative prices of rare earths fall and induce a more rare earth-
intensive production. Four reasons explain why export restrictions, nevertheless, might
be favourable compared to less disturbing policy instruments.
Firstly, even if China’s long-term strategy for rare earths is motivated by overcom-
ing path dependencies rather than simple beggar-thy-neighbour policies, they are still
complementary in the short-run. Secondly, a diverse number of sectors benefit from the
implicit subsidies. Spreading the subsidies avoids choosing specific industries to be sub-
sidised, avoiding the problem of ”picking losers” (e.g. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007).
Thirdly, the WTO decided that export restrictions are not considered subsidies for down-
stream products and countervailing tariff measures are not allowed under WTO regulation
(WTO, 2001). Fourthly, if the People’s Republic is able to induce sufficient relocation of
downstream industries in the time frame in which it possesses market power, declining
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margin on international prices is acceptable. It might even be useful because firms can
anticipate that the subsidies have a “date of expiry” on them.
3.3 Conserving Exhaustible Resources
Chinese defense in the WTO dispute settlement on rare earths is primarily based on two
arguments: Firstly, that export barriers are used to bring rare earths back on a sustainable
extraction path. Secondly, that they are used to prevent environmental damages from
mining rare earths.
In 2011, China provided around 97 per cent of world supply of rare earths, whereas
Chinese resources just accounted for 50 per cent of world resources (U.S. Geological Sur-
vey, 2012b). The high share of supply is perceived as unsustainable by Chinese authorities
(SCIO, 2012). It might indeed be a symptom of inefficiently fast extraction.
Insecure property rights can accelerate extraction sub-optimally. The mergers of rare
earth suppliers in Inner Mongolia, which were ordered by the central government, show
that mining firms face a risk of being expropriated. Private suppliers have to consider
such insecurities with respect to property rights and, consequently, decide upon their
extraction path under higher discount rates. Large-scale, capital-intensive mines face
smaller incentives to extract inefficiently quick. While weak property rights encourage
fast depletion, they also reduce the incentive to invest in capacities (Bohn and Deacon,
2000). Labour intensive illegal mining operations do not require large investments and
extract faster. Being illegal induces additional risks for miners and leads to further a
acceleration of depletion. Note that the insecure property rights are partially policy-
induced themselves.
Inter-generational welfare considerations can also justify policy intervention. How
rents from extracting exhaustible resources are used determines whether an extraction
path is welfare optimal. If the decline in stocks of rare earths is offset by investing in
produced capital, Chinese authorities might be indifferent between extracting today and
extracting tomorrow (Hartwick’s rule). Investment in produced capital might be lower
than the decline in stocks of rare earths. Hence, there can be an incentive for Chinese
policy makers to slow down extraction.
The most efficient way to slow down the extraction of rare earths is to regulate the
quantity being extracted. In 2009, authorities did a first step on their way to gain control
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over the extraction path of rare earth resources by implementing production quotas. In
2012, the restructuring of the market followed. These measures are signs for the Chinese
efforts to control the domestic market and slow down extraction.
Considerable illegal mining, especially in remote and mountainous southern regions of
China, indicate that existing mine-site regulation is ineffective. Recent reports support
the interpretation that institutional reasons impede implementing mine-site regulation
(Wu¨bbeke, 2013). Local and provincial policy makers benefit from extraction and lack
incentives to enforce regulations in the area for which they are responsible (Want China
Times, 2013, for a recent example). In practice, enforcing mine-site regulation might be
prohibitively costly for the national government.
We argue that regulating the extraction path is part of the Chinese government’s
long-term strategy. Rare earths will remain a resource with a high value for the Chi-
nese economy, even in the presence of agglomeration effects. China’s government wants
to provide its economy with a secure supply of domestically mined rare earths in the
future. Therefore, authorities use export policy, in combination with the policy mea-
sures implemented since 2009, as second-best policy to regulate the extraction path for
its rare earth resources and smoothen national consumption over time. If export barriers
actually slow down extraction, they create welfare gains for Chinese governments from a
more efficient extraction schedule. But the increasingly high share of Chinese domestic
rare earth consumption makes export policy less and less effective as a second-best policy
instrument.
3.4 Reducing Pollution
Environmental damages caused by the mining and separation of rare earths are well docu-
mented by various sources. The Chinese White Paper (SCIO, 2012) lists contamination by
radioactive elements and severe pollution of surface and ground water as well as reduced
food crop output. These statements are backed by a report published by the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2012). Hong Kong based think tank Civic Exchange
accuses the techniques used in the illegal mining of rare earths and the lack of official
supervision as one of the main reasons for environmental problems in the Dongjiang river
system (Guangdong Province), the main source of water supply for the Hong Kong ag-
glomeration (Liu, 2012).
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Since the 1980s, comparatively low environmental standards have contributed to
China’s power on rare earth markets. The closure of the Mountain Pass Mine in Cal-
ifornia, for example, was at least partially caused by its inability to satisfy environmental
standards. China specialised in the pollution-intensive production of rare earths, creating
a pollution haven.
The growth of income since the 1980s has plausibly increased the Chinese valuation for
a clean environment, relative to the valuation of consumption, entailing bids for stricter
regulation directed towards the authorities. Policy follows their citizens’ preferences,
putting more emphasis on environmental policies.
First-best policy actions internalise the negative externalities directly where they oc-
cur. In our case, the most suitable way to deal with these problems is implementing
measures tackling externalities at the mine sites. Apparently, Chinese authorities are
aware of that. In order to efficiently counteract the negative consequences of rare earth
production for the environment, they implemented various measures in the market in re-
cent years. Table 3 provides a list of these measures.4 Due to limited data, the impact of
these interventions on production decisions is not clear. But especially the resource tax
seems to be an ambitious step towards the reduction of domestic supply, since the tax
accounts for 20 per cent of the firms’ production costs. Also, the environmental standards
implemented in 2011 could lead to a rise in production costs of 70 per cent for the mining
companies (Wu¨bbeke, 2013).
Export restrictions attain justification for reasons touched already in the discussion on
the conservation of exhaustible resources. The costs of monitoring or enforcing regulations
on the mining sector might be prohibitively high. Either because rare earths can be
extracted using very simple technologies in remote areas, predominantly in the southern
regions, or because local authorities benefit from extraction activities and do not enforce
regulations sufficiently. Again, the growing share of Chinese rare earth consumption limits
the effectiveness of export restrictions as a means to reduce pollution.
Let us assume that China possesses a comparative advantage in rare earth dependent
industries. If the export barriers contribute to overcoming path dependencies, they make
these industries relocate into the People’s Republic. That will expand production beyond
4For more detailed information on the implemented measures see Wu¨bbeke (2013).
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Year Measure
Pigouvian Tax 2011 Resource tax of 60 RMB per ton LREE minerals
and 30 RMB per ton HREE minerals extracted
→ rise of approx. 2.000% (LRE) and 7.500%
(HREE) compared to the tax before 2011
Pollution rights 2011 Emission standards of pollutants from
the rare earth industry
2012 Measures for the environmental protection
Inspection of rare earth enterprises
Regulation of 2009 Control indices of 2009-2011
respective industries 2012 Restructuring of the market
Table 3: Policies implemented by the Chinese government
levels achieved without the export restrictions. Export barriers are likely to be subject to
rebound effects if not accompanied by mine site regulation.
Export restrictions can reduce pollution from rare earth extraction, and thus rise
domestic welfare. They are justified as second-best instruments if mine-site regulation
cannot be enforced. However, their effectiveness falls as the share of domestic rare earth
consumption grows. Furthermore, they are subject to rebound effects. Thus, we conclude
that the strength of this channel to justify export barriers is continuously declining.
3.5 Special Interest Policies
Up until now, policy makers’ decisions have been motivated by increasing their citizens’
welfare, either because of the politicians’ benevolence or because it serves their own in-
terest. Now, we consider purely self-interested behaviour as a motivation. We analyse
if contributions by special interest groups influence their decisions. Two conditions have
to be fulfilled. Firstly, policy makers have to derive utility from special interest groups’
contributions. Secondly, export restrictions need to increase the sum of contributions they
receive from lobby groups.
Table 4 displays China’s ranks in the Transparency International Corruption Percep-
tions Index (CPI) and in the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators’ (WGI)
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Control of Corruption index. The People’s Republic achieves only mediocre results in
both surveys. This indicates that serving special interest groups has some importance in
policy decisions.
CPI WGI
Year Value Rank Value Rank
2000 3.1 63 -0.24 95
2007 3.5 72 -0.59 138
2012 39* 80 -0.48 128
Table 4: China in international corruption surveys
Source: Transparency International (2012, 2007, 2000); World Bank (2013)
* Due to methodological changes, the values from 2012 are not comparable to results for
previous years.
The second condition requires trade restrictions to increase the sum of contributions.
Mitra (1999) provides a theory of lobby formation based on the endogenous trade policy
model by Grossman and Helpman (1994). He finds that inelastic demand, market con-
centration, small geographic dispersion, and large capital stocks raise the propensity of
being organised and, thus, being able to influence policy decisions.
Rare earths are used in a number of diverse industries, many of which are unconcen-
trated. 130 firms produce NdFeB permanent magnets in China, for example (Wu¨bbeke,
2013). Rare earths account for a small share of overall costs in many applications. Each
individual firm can only reap a small share of its own investment in influencing policy
decisions, creating a strong incentive to free-ride and making successful lobbying unlikely.
The rare earth mining sector exhibits characteristics more favourable for lobbying
activities. Despite the substantial role small scale mining plays in China, the industry is
dominated by a few large firms. The most outstanding one is Baotou Steel Rare Earth
Hi-Tech (Group) Company, a subsidiary of Baotou Steel. State owned Baotou Steel is
China’s second and the world’s fourth largest steel producer (World Steel Association,
2013). It accounts for about 50 per cent of Chinese rare earth production and is currently
integrating further firms in Inner Mongolia to become the only producer in the northern
region. Regional monopolists are to be created in other regions as well, further increasing
the sector’s concentration.
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Theoretical reasoning indicates that the mining sector can lobby more effectively in its
own favour than rare earth consuming industries. That contradicts with the tight export
barriers leading to burdens for the Chinese mining sector. Policy makers need some way
to compensate firms possessing lobbying power.
Anecdotic evidence indicates that export quotas play a role for that. Binding export
quotas create rents which can be shared between the government and firms. Take the
creation of a monopolistic rare earth supplier in Inner Mongolia as an example. In late
2012, Baotou Steel Rare-Earth was reported to have concluded integration agreements
with 12 other rare earth producers in Inner Mongolia (China Daily, 2012). Those firms
agreed to transfer a 51 per cent stake to Baotou Steel. In return, Baotou Steel ”will
support the 12 parties in areas relating to production and export quotas” (Currie, 2013).
It appears as if the rents are used to compensate the smaller firms.
Again, we have to check for opportunity costs. The most efficient way to redistribute
wealth to lobbying groups is plausibly lump-sum transfers. There are, nevertheless, rea-
sons why export restrictions might be preferable to policy makers. Export barriers on raw
materials are not considered subsidies for downstream industries by the WTO (WTO,
2001), reducing the danger of countervailing measures by trading partners. Trade re-
strictions are easier to justify to the population than monetary transfers. They can be
motivated by arguments such as that the nation is selling its natural wealth too cheaply or
that the country should not be burdened with environmental damage without reaping the
benefits (Jin, 2010; ?; MOFCOM, 2012). As mentioned before, rents from quantitative
restrictions can be used to compensate losers of trade barriers.
3.6 Generating Government Revenues
The last motive potentially explaining why the Chinese government restricts rare earth
exports is generating government revenues. Export tariffs yield revenues, as do the abol-
ished VAT deductions on rare earth exports. The export quotas can yield income to the
government but that depends on how they are allocated.
The exact income from taxes and tariffs on rare earth exports is not published but a
rough estimate is possible. Chinese rare earth exports add up to 2.7 billion US$ in 2011
and 0.9 billion US$ in 2012. If we assume that these numbers include export taxes of 15
per cent, which is the lower bound, and add the 16 per cent value added tax, the taxes
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yield government revenues of 670 million US$ and 230 million US$, respectively. Overall
tax revenues were 1.42 trillion US$ in 2011 and 1.8 trillion US$ in 2012. Taxes on rare
earth exports are not a major part of China’s government revenues.
Recall that many rare earth suppliers are state-owned. Taxes reducing their profits
redistribute wealth within the public sector but do not generate net government income.
On the other hand, if the export barriers foster growth in downstream industries, tax
revenues might increase in the long run.
As long as a large fraction of rare earths is sold abroad, export taxes resemble an
extraction tax. As in the case of environmental protection and resource conservation, ex-
port taxes can be justified as a second-best instrument. But, again, the growing domestic
demand limits their effectiveness.
4 Recent Developments
Two recent developments in the markets for and the international policy on rare earths
are discussed in the light of our results. Firstly, the WTO’s dispute settlement on Chinese
export restrictions. Secondly, the emergence of non-Chinese rare earth producers and
their struggle to stay in the market.
4.1 WTO Dispute Settlement
In March 2012, the US, the EU, and Japan filed a complaint at the World Trade Organi-
zation about Chinese trade restrictions for rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum. In a
public announcement, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce defends its export policy.
”China’s rare earth measures, including imposing export quotas, are fair and
legitimate, and are simply aimed at protecting its environment as well as its
natural resources. They also conform to relevant WTO rule. [. . . ] Therefore, it
is crystal clear that Western countries are aiming at pressing China to continue
providing irrationally cheap rare earth despite serious pollution problems.”
(MOFCOM, 2012)
The statement refers indirectly to the articles XX (b) and XX (g) of the GATT,
conceding exceptions to the general prohibition of quantitative export restrictions codified
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in Article XI if they aim either at the protection of human life and health (article XX
(b)) or at the conservation of exhaustible resources (article XX (g)). However, the latter
entails the need for a conjunct implementation of restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.
In March 2014, the WTO published a report largely following the complainants ar-
guments (WTO, 2014). The panel argued that the export barriers are inconsistent with
general WTO regulations and with the commitment to reduce or abolish export restric-
tions on raw materials which China made in its accession protocol.
The People’s Republic abolished its export quotas on rare earths effective January 1st
2015. The export taxes are to be dropped at the 2nd May 2015 (Shen, 2015a). While
formally complying to the WTO ruling, it is not clear whether China is giving up its
influence on rare earth trade. The consolidation of Chinese rare earth producers into six
firms is expected to be completed in 2015. The government plans to “establish a strong
cooperation mechanism” (Shen, 2015b) between these companies. A system of export
licenses is planned to be introduced, re-regulating rare earth sales abroad (Shen, 2015b).
It is unclear if these measures will effectively restrict exports. Their intransparent nature
will ease allocating rents, however, and satisfying special interest groups’ claims.
4.2 New Non-Chinese Suppliers
Currently, two mines extract major quantities of rare earths outside China: The Mountain
Pass mine owned by Molycorp and Lynas’s Mount Weld mine in Australia. Both produce
mostly light rare earths. Market experts state that lanthanum and cerium, the most
common rare earths, are already oversupplied. Neodymium and praseodymium, two other
important products of these mines, are less affected by falling prices. Figure 7 shows the
prices for the four metals. While lanthanum and cerium prices are only twice as they
were in 2007, neodymium and praseodymium cost more than 10 times as in 2007. Facing
lower prices and higher costs than expected, both firms struggle to stay in the market
(e.g. Lifton, 2015). In mid 2014, Molycorp barely avoided bankruptcy (Ecclestone, 2014).
The problems experienced by Molycorp and Lynas indicate that Chinese power on
rare earth markets will plausibly continue. Optimistic scenarios as in Pothen (2013, 2014)
appear less likely. If China is able to restrict exports using the licensing system, it can
retain its influence on rare earth markets.
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5 Conclusions
Export restrictions on metals have increased in number and severity since 2003. Even
exotic materials were affected by trade barriers. They are not consumed by households
directly. Thus, strong distributive effects due to intervention in their markets are unlikely.
Immediate macroeconomic effects of such policies are improbable. We take rare earth
elements as a case study to investigate why it is, nevertheless, appealing to limit trade
flows of exotic raw materials.
Five main motivations for restricting exports are inspected: Influencing the terms-of-
trade, attracting rare earth-based industries, reducing pollution from mining and separat-
ing rare earths, serving special interest groups, and generating government revenues.
Comparing the theoretical results with stylised facts from rare earth markets and
actual Chinese policy yields a number of important insights. Attracting foreign firms is
an important driver of export barriers. They are part of a long-term strategy to turn the
People’s Republic into a stronghold of rare earth-based industries which mostly relies on
generating knowledge and the education of a specialised labour force. Exploiting market
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power in the short-run is much less of a motivation, though the goals are complementary.
We find, in accordance with Hayes-Labruto et al. (2013) and Wu¨bbeke (2013), that
environmental protection and conservation of natural resources are important drivers of
policy decisions. Export barriers can serve as a second-best instrument if regulating
mines directly is not feasible. Growing domestic demand for the metals constrains their
effectiveness. Environmental protection and resource conservation represent less and less
of a justification for export barriers, in particular if the export restrictions contribute to
raising domestic rare earth demand in the long run.
Theoretical considerations imply that firms supplying rare earths have a higher propen-
sity of lobbying successfully than those demanding them. Export restrictions, which bur-
den the mining sector, appear at odds with serving special interest groups as a motive.
Evidence suggests that the specific set up of the restriction, in particular the quotas,
creates leeway to satisfy demands from special interest groups.
It is likely that the main policy drivers identified for the case of China and the rare
earth elements drive export restrictions in other nations and for other metals as well.
Governments want to relocate downstream industries, and protect exhaustible resources
as well as the environment, while taking into account the special interest groups.
Taking these motives into account helps designing policies to avoid trade barriers and
the associated distortions. Helping countries to create efficient mine site regulations and
to set up institutions able to enforce them reduces the need for export barriers as a second-
best instrument. Supporting them in educating well-trained labour force and encouraging
FDI allows for creating competitive downstream industries.
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